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ABSTRACT
We present a privacy-preserving framework for the protec-
tion of location from potentially untrustworthy location pro-
viders (LP), offering geolocation services to LBS subscribers,
across indoor and outdoor settings. This framework, called
Placeprint, is built on the metaphor of private place[1]. A
private place is a user-defined spatial context which belongs
to the personal sphere of an individual, e.g. home. In Pla-
ceprint, users equipped with commodity devices, can be ge-
olocated in private places without revealing to the LP their
presence. Moreover users can specify context-based privacy
rules to forestall the disclosure of private places also to LBS
providers. The ultimate goal is to provide users with the
capability of exercising flexible control over the disclosure of
the position to both LP and LBS provider.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
H.2.8 [Database management]: Database applications—
Spatial databases and GIS ; K.4.1 [Computers and soci-
ety]: Public Policy Issues—Privacy
General Terms
Design, algorithms
Keywords
Privacy, location-based services, wi-fi, context-based privacy
1. INTRODUCTION
LBS provide spatially contextualized information services
to location-aware mobile devices (clients). Very often the
position is provided by a third party LP, e.g. Skyhook Wire-
less and Google Location Service. The client requests the
position from the LP and then forwards such position a-
long with the service request to the LBS provider (Figure
1). Typically, LPs offer geolocation services both indoor and
outdoor, provided that the requester of the service transmits
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appropriate contextual information, e.g. Wi-Fi access points
in proximity (e.g., AP1, ..., APn). In a metropolitan region,
with high density of Wi-Fi networks, the position can have
an accuracy of 10-20 meters1. Note that users can inter-
Figure 1: LBS Architecture: the client transmits to
the LP contextual information (e.g. set of Wi-Fi
access points, AP1,..APn) to obtain the position
act with diverse LBS providers offering different services,
therefore LPs are in a position to compile extensive record-
s of users’ location and movement. As LPs are potentially
untrustworthy, privacy is seriously at stake. Unfortunate-
ly, existing privacy-preserving techniques, such as [2] do not
protect the position from the LP but exclusively from the
LBS provider; moreover, LPs do not generally accept anony-
mous communications (e.g., onion routing).
To more clearly motivate this privacy issue, consider the
following scenario in which Alice is subscriber of a LBS. Al-
ice is not concerned with the disclosure of her exact position
except when she is at home and in few other places, such
as the hospital where she is undertaking a medical treat-
ment. Therefore when she is in one of those locations, Alice
requires a coarse region to be disclosed in place of the true
position. Imagine that Alice encodes this requirement in pri-
vacy rules, using for example a IETF GeoPriv-like privacy
preference language [3]. A rule can be written:
Home→ CityOf(Home)
This rule means that whenever Alice is at home then the
position to be disclosed is the city in which Alice lives, say
the coordinates of Milan. The enforcement of this rule is
seemingly straightforward: the client first requests its posi-
tion from the LP; next, if such position is in proximity of
home (assuming that home is assigned a position), the client
1http://www.skyhookwireless.com/howitworks/
computes the coordinates of the city using for example a re-
verse geocoding service. Unfortunately, this approach leads
to a privacy leak because the position is necessarily disclosed
to the LP which computes it. Consider also that in this s-
cenario, indoor positioning services can be only provided by
the LP as users are assumed to use commodity devices and
services.
Placeprint provides users with the capability of handling
spatial contexts, such as home, in a privacy-preserving way.
Contexts, once defined, are automatically recognized with-
out revealing to the LP the user’s presence in those places.
Moreover users can define context-based privacy rules to
specify the position to be transmitted to the LBS provider.
These rules enable the integration of existing privacy pre-
serving techniques, such as location obfuscation methods.
2. HANDLING PRIVATE PLACES
We argue that an approach to the protection of position
from LP is to minimize the interaction with it. The moti-
vating observation is that the amount of information that
the user transmits to the LP exceeds what is really neces-
sary to determine the users’ position. For example every
time a service is requested from a given place, e.g. home,
the client transmits the same or similar contextual informa-
tion, e.g. Wi-Fi access points. Based on this observation,
we envision a solution in which clients acquire the capa-
bility of recognizing places that have been already visited.
This way the position is only requested to the LP when it
is strictly necessary. We confine the protection to a sub-
set of positions, in particular those which can be associated
with private places. Private place is an abstraction which
conceptualizes the intuition that there are some regions of
space that belong to the personal sphere. Private places are
user-defined, e.g. home, myfriend, and are not confined to
any specific setting, i.e. indoor/outdoor, or physical bound-
ary. Whenever the user is in a private space, the position
should not be disclosed to the LP. The technical challenge
posed by the private place metaphor is recognizing whether
the position is inside or outside a private place without inter-
acting everytime with the LP. We refer to this operation as
place recogniton. For example, techniques for dynamic place
recognition such as [4, 5] enable the recognition of places
that have been already visited based on the characteristics
of the Wif-Fi and GSM infrastucture nearby. We take inspi-
ration from these approaches to develop a solution for the
recognition of private places.
Minimizing the interaction with the LP, however, does
not forestall the disclosure of the private place to the LBS
provider, e.g. every time Alice is at home, a position con-
ventionally associated with the private place at the time the
place is defined, is disclosed to the LBS provider (conversely
the service could not be requested). Therefore if the LBS
provider is untrustworthy or collude with the LP, location
privacy is again at risk. To achieve a comprehensive protec-
tion of location from both the data collectors (LP and LBS
provider), Placeprint enables the specification of context-
based location transformation rules, globally defining the
privacy policy of the user.
Section 2 illustrates the system architecture, Section 3
presents the interaction flow, i.e how users specify private
places and privacy preferences, and what is achieved. The
conclusive section reports future plans.
Figure 2: Placeprint architecture
3. ARCHITECTURE
Placeprint runs on the client. Figure 2 illustrates the sys-
tem architecture. The Request Handler is the entry point of
the system accepting and responding to geolocation request-
s. Geolocation requests are processed by two components,
the Private Place Handler and the Privacy Policy Handler,
respectively:
- The Private Place Handler is the key component en-
abling the construction and recognition of private places.
Places are created upon explicit user’s request by as-
sociating a name to a place signature defined in terms
of GSM cells and Wi-Fi access points (hereinafter, bea-
cons). Private places are then recognized by matching
current context with one of the place signatures record-
ed in the Place DB. If the location is innocuous (i.e.
not private), the system interacts with the LP to get
the accurate coordinates while the returned placename
is null.
- The Privacy Policy Handler enforces the context-based
privacy rules stored in the Privacy Policy DB. It match-
es the outcome of the Place Handler against the priva-
cy rules stored in the Privacy Policy DB and possibly
applies position transformation functions, taken from
a library of operations, to determine the location to be
finally disclosed.
3.1 Private Place Handler
Key issue is defining the place signature. In [4, 5], a place
signature is a response-rate histogram constructed by re-
peatedly scanning the networks in a time window. A place
is then recognized if its signature is similar to one of the sig-
natures previously built and then recorded. Unfortunately,
constructing and thus also recognizing the place signature
takes significant time (i.e. up to 10 seconds)). This is pri-
marily due to the fact that the system needs to identify the
whole set of beacons in proximity of a place, in a situation
in which the radio signal is subject to noise and attenuation
and thus beacons are listened intermittently. In our do-
main, place recognition has to be instantaneous, in order to
not compromise the quality of the geolocation service. This
motivates the investigation of a different approach, which
sacrifices a little of accuracy for efficiency.
3.1.1 Creating a place signature
The idea is to define a place signature as set of observa-
tions, where an observation is the set of beacons that are de-
tected at a certain position and instant. Formally an obser-
vation is a binary vector o=(b1, b2, ..bn) in the n-dimensional
beacon space where bi = 1 if the i-esim beacon is detected
and bi = 0 otherwise. A signature s is a set of distinct ob-
servations, i.e. s={o1, .., oq} with oi 6= oj . In a metropoli-
tan area where tens of beacons can be listened, observations
do not repeat frequently, even at high sampling rates. The
minimum number of observations in a signature is set exper-
imentally (e.g. 20). Two place signatures are said to overlap
when the same observation is present in both signatures. In
order to ensure that places are distinguishable, we introduce
the constraint that the maximum degree of pairwise similar-
ity between the observations in the two signatures must be
not greater than a threshold value τ ∈ [0, 1) (distinguisha-
bility constraint). For example if τ = 0, the observations in
the two signatures must not share any beacon. We use as
similarity measure the Jaccard index applied to binary vec-
tors (i.e. Tanimoto index ), namely given two observations
oi = (x1, ..., xm) and oj = (y1, ..., ym), the index J ∈ [0, 1] is
computed as follows:
J((x1, ..., xm), (y1, ..., ym)) =
∑
i(xi ∧ yi)∑
i(xi ∨ yi)
Denoted with with dj the Jaccard distance, i.e. 1-J, the
distinguishability constraint between signatures s1 and s2
can be expressed as:
min
oi∈s1,oj∈s2
dj(oi, oj) > τ
The Jaccard distance is a metric. With little abuse of termi-
nology we refer to the quantity d(s1, s2) = minoi∈s1,oj∈s2 dj(oi, oj)
as the distance between two places of signature si and sj .
We can thus say that two places are distinguishable if their
distance is greater than τ . Signatures are stored in the
PlaceDB. Each signature is associated with a representative
point (x,y).
3.1.2 Recognizing private places
This operation takes in input the current observation oc
and returns a place name if the point is estimated to fall in
such a place, otherwise null. A point is within a given place
when the minimum distance between the singleton signature
sc = {oc}, and the signature s of the place does not exceed
threshold value δ ≤ τ , i.e.
d(sc, s) ≤ δ
The operation is performed as follows: it determines the
set of signatures H = {si}i satisfying the above inequality,
i.e. d(sc, si) ≤ δ. If |H|=1, the place is found; if |H|=0,
the position is innocuous; if |H|>1, the current observation
is classified using k-nearest neighbor over the beacon vec-
tor space with metric the Jaccard distance. Denoted with
KNN = {o1, .., ok} the set of k closest observations to oc
(from any signature), the current observation is classified of
place p if it holds:
p = argmaxplace
∑
oi∈KNN
I(placeOf(oi) = place)
where placeOf(oi) is the place the observation oi refers to
and I (e)=1 if e=true, 0 othw. Experimentally, the value of
the parameter δ is set to δ = τ = 0.3.
3.1.3 Enhancing accuracy
The gain in efficiency is paid in terms of accuracy where
accuracy, in our context, refers to the capability of recogniz-
ing when the user is inside or outside a private place. False
positives are the positions classified as private even though
they are innocuous. This result into loss of spatial accura-
cy. False negatives are the positions which are considered
innocuous while in reality are private. This results into pri-
vacy loss. Three methods are proposed to enhance accuracy:
a) Signatures are automatically upgraded with new observa-
tions once these observations are classified. As a result the
more places are visited, the more accurate their recognition.
b) Lowering the value of δ. This reduces the risk of false
negatives at the expenses of spatial accuracy, therefore it
requires appropriate tuning. c) Signatures are deliberately
upgraded by users for example based on feedbacks provided
by the system.
3.2 Privacy policy handler
If the user is detected in a private place, the Policy Han-
dler can choose to perturb the location to transmit or even
to suppress it, depending on the user’s preferences encod-
ed in the privacy policy. The rules of the privacy policies
are expressed in a simple language which takes inspiration
from the privacy preferences languages proposed for location
sharing applications [6, 3]. A privacy rule takes the form:
r : context→ transformation
where: context is a place condition possibly coupled with a
temporal condition; and transformation is a function map-
ping the coordinates provided by the Private Place Handler
onto the final location or Null (i.e. location is suppressed).
The set of rules {r1, r2, ..rk} forms the user’s (privacy) pol-
icy.
A place condition can be: a) a user-defined private place;
b) a system-defined place e.g. PrivatePlace and Everywhere.
For example home is true if the user is estimated to be in the
private place labeled home; PrivateP lace is true if the po-
sition falls in some private place, it does not matter which;
Everywhere is true in any location (i.e. private and non
private). A temporal condition is specified by the interval:
[< time >< time >] where time is a temporal value, e.g.
hours and/or days of the week. A temporal condition is
true if the current time is contained in the specified inter-
val. In case of conflict among rules, the rule of the most
specific place prevails. Further multiple rules can be defined
for the same place over not-overlapping intervals. The lan-
guage includes system-defined variables, e.g.(current) Point,
(current) Place.
Transformations potentially includes a variety of opera-
tions. Simple transformations return a fake position or a
coarse regions at predefined granularity. Non trivial ob-
fuscation techniques might include, for example, semantic
location cloaking [2]. Below some examples of privacy rules:
• Home, [19:00, 08:00] → cityOf(Place) specifies that when
the user is at home in the specified time interval, the
position is mapped onto the city of the private place.
• PrivatePlace [19:00, 08:00] → Null specifies that when
the user is in a private place in the time interval, the
position is not disclosed (or is not meaningful). Note
that this can be the default rule
• Everywhere, [08:00, 19:00] → SemanticCloaking() spec-
ifies that any position in the time interval is mapped
onto the map generated by semantic location cloaking
[2]. This map contains pre-computed cloaked regions
enclosing sensitive places, e.g. hospitals.
4. DEMO STORY LINE
(a) Creating a new private
place
(b) Creating a new rule
Figure 3: Privacy preferences
This demo illustrates the key functionalities of the Pla-
ceprint prototype. Developed in Java, the system runs on a
device equipped with Android 2.3 (or higher). In particular,
the demo shows how users can interact with the system to
create places and privacy preferences, and share locations
at varying and user-dependent granularity. The outcome of
Placeprint is exemplified by the application Here I am.
(a) Requesting the location (b) Shared location
Figure 4: An application using Placeprint
- Creating a private place. From the user’s perspec-
tive the operation is very simple (Figure 3). The user
enters the name of the place, in this case office, and
possibly the number of observations to acquire, then
activates the acquisition of the place signature. The
operation is fast. As a result, the representative posi-
tion of the newly created place and summary data are
displayed, including the number of beacons detected
in proximity, e.g. 14 Wi-Fi Access Points.
- Creating a privacy rule. Figure 3.(b) shows the
interface for entering the rule: the user specifies the
rule name, e.g. @work, selects the place the rule is
to be associated with from a list, e.g. office, possibly
specifies a temporal constraint, e.g. working time, and
finally selects the transformation from a list of opera-
tions, e.g. the function cityOf(Place).
- Here I am. This application, illustrated in Fig-
ure 4.(a), displays the user’s location returned by Pla-
ceprint. For example, if the true location is sufficiently
close to the office, the place Office is recognized and
the privacy rule @Work is activated. The matching
index provides the user with information on place ac-
curacy (i.e. the Jaccard Index). The outcome of the
transformation operation is the location displayed in
Figure 4.(b) at granularity of city. For demo purpos-
es the location is named with the private place name.
Actually, the shared location only consists of the pair
(point, accuracy).
5. CONCLUSIONS
Placeprint offers a first solution to the novel problem of
protecting the user’s location from untrusted LPs. The sys-
tem integrates three different technologies, i.e. place learn-
ing, privacy policies and more conventional location privacy
enhancing technologies, e.g. location obfuscation, to pro-
vide customizable protection against different parties. Fu-
ture work will focus on conceptual extensions of both the
place recognition method, e.g. to detect entrance and exit
from private places, and the policy specification language.
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